The first of these forces [war] was very much a creature of the industrial age. Earlier wars had produced mixed results, as victors profited and losers paid.Is very substantially wrong. War has always been labor-intensive and wealth-destroying, and labor needs to get paid. In Europe war meant more money to artisans and and commoners at least back to the Middle Ages; politically, it also meant concessions. IIRC, in England the franchise was explicitly extended down to those subject to service as bowmen. In the early Modern period, for another, Spain went bankrupt repeatedly fighting wars. All that money was mostly never repaid, and was borrowed from rich people; it was spent mostly on middle- or working-class people, soldiers, artisans, merchants. In the same period, for related reasons, there was major sustained inflation right across Europe, hitting AFAIK the rich the most.
the past suggests there is no plausible way to vote, regulate, or teach society back to the levels of equality enjoyed by the postwar generation.There has been exactly one postwar generation on the scale of WWII, and no-one has yet tried to restore that level of equality. The only other levelling of remotely comparable scale was post-WWI, and that didn't have time to develop on the same lines; and more importantly was immediately knocked flat by massive deflation anyway.
We need to restrict free speech to natural persons, not corporations or PACs. We need to limit campaign contributions so that people can't buy representatives. If you can't vote you shouldn't be able to donate to political campaigns, and the total amount a single person can donate should be restricted to a modest amount like maybe $500. It would require a constitutional amendment, but IMO it would take the edge off a great deal of bad things.
We need to restrict free speech to natural persons, not corporations or PACs
I am sympathetic to this, but it's conceptually complicated -- any actual speech comes from a natural person, ultimately. I can make it work for 'money isn't speech, so corporate money isn't speech', but beyond that, it's confusing.
It is always theoretically possible for the bottom 51%-ish to get massive redistribution democratically. This doesn't happen, but it could happen.
I think Trump would still have been elected in the world of 3.
Anyway, my takeaway from the post is that I welcome the imminent climate-change cataclysm as a force for social justice and equality. It's going to be epic.
Also, China* was characterized for most of its history since c.400BC by high levels of equality created by state-enforced breakup of large estates and divisibility of patrimony, enforced most strongly at the foundation of each dynasty. Inequality always increased over time, tending to result in the collapse of those dynasties, but that was usually over periods of centuries, rather than the decades the OP considers. China doesn't fit properly into the author's categories (war, revolution, epidemic, state failure). Each dynastic transition was accompanied by elements of all four, but the key was a tradition of egalitarian policy. That policy aimed of course at eliminating the aristocracy, so maximizing inequality between the imperial family and everyone else, and in the long run was of dubious value to put it charitably; but it is a truly massive exception to the OP's main claim.
*That is, for most of history, about 1/4 of the species.
The whole thing seems to downplay how much inequality reduction was in fact achieved during the Trente Glorieuse. Just that it was the aftermath of a war doesn't mean it was only possible because of war - although obviously the war helped a lot, it could have gone otherwise had the political conditions been different.
(To be clear, I know the political conditions were inextricable from the war too - it wasn't just the explosives. But then the war was related to the political conditions too; there could have been a very different postwar consensus.)
Technology has made mass warfare obsoleteOnly dubiously true. If 'modern technology' means precision weapons, we don't know yet; if nukes: (1) the Cold War had at least some of the leveling effects of hot war, in virtue of sustained public spending; and continued cold war maybe continues to have some of that effect in South Korea and Taiwan (and Israel?); (2) the nuclear period has seen at least three mass-mobilization* wars (Korea, Vietnam, Iran-Iraq); each was complicated by external supply lines, but did have massive internal effects**. *At least for the local participants. **Whether strongly egalitarian I don't know.
8: I was under the impression that aristocratic power was roughly a function of dynasty age and (logistical) distance from the capital. 山高皇帝远 and all that.
13: Yes. "inequality increasing over time"="aristocratic power mounting with dynasty age". Should have worded that better. Logistical distance - yes, but the emperors obviously could level a big enough chunk of their society to remain imperial. Until they couldn't.
What 4 said about 3.
We need to restrict free speech to natural persons, not corporations or PACs.
Isn't the "New York Times" problem insurmountable? Doesn't a news organization need protection as a corporation from infringements of the right to free speech?
The OP essentially is trite and dumb. It pretends to deep historical insights, while having in fact only scattered, shallow, insights which are already widely known among anyone with even marginal historical literacy; which I think can fairly be taken to include everyone who reads The Atlantic.
Ok, I'm done. Thanks chris, that made me feel better.
Actually not done. The OP is defeatist.
Technology has made mass warfare obsolete
Yeah, no. Warfare is becoming less common, but it is not obviously becoming less massy. In fact, as insurgencies and civil wars become a larger share of the total amount of conflict, war will become more massy; insurgencies tend to substitute people for technology to a very large degree because that's the nature of an insurgency.
And when is mass warfare supposed to have stopped happening, anyway? 1991, when there were more AFVs clashing in the Iraqi desert than there were at Kursk? 1998, with the Ethiopians and Eritreans waging trench warfare on a corps level? 2006, when the Iraqi insurgency had fifty thousand people fighting?
Actually not done. The OP is defeatist.
We should have a separate shorthands for "original post" and "the article linked in the original post." because they aren't the same thing (and perhaps even a way to distinguish "the excerpts in the OP").
I refer at all points to the article linked in the OP. Neither chris nor Heebie are defeatist and/or trite and/or dumb.
From reading The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, it seems like the British did a pretty good job of dismantling the great land owning elite class just by putting big inheritance taxes on estates. I'm not sure quite why they managed that without a war (the process was already in motion before WWI).
I think Trump would still have been elected in the world of 3.
Kind of yeah, but A. the world of 3 is so different I'm not sure*, and B. in the world of 3, he doesn't have compliant Congress.
*on the most practical level, in the world of 3, elite consensus isn't tied to slashing entitlements, which was Trump's most salient addition to Republican stances other than saying the quiet parts loud. Beyond that, in the world of 3, the spiral of disconnectedness form reality that characterizes modern Republicanism never happens
I'd love an answer to 22. Hint hint, Brits.
24: I suppose the fact that the wealth in question was specifically in the form of land had something to do with it. Unlike other forms of wealth, you can't hide land with accounting tricks or move it out of the country.
It seems like you could paraphrase it like so: In a catastrophe, everyone's well-being is translated downward, and everyone who goes into negative well-being dies, so the remaining positive values have a much smaller range.
It's not quite that though, is it? In the wake of the Black Death, for instance, the welfare of the surviving peasants actually improved.
Not to mention the problem that you can't really pick out many periods, in European history at least, that weren't in the aftermath of a major war, a violent revolution, a state collapse or a catastrophic epidemic. Especially if you define aftermath as the next 30-40 years. So it's a bit tricky to say that that's what caused a reduction in inequality.
And how come, if major wars reduce inequality, that you see reductions in inequality in postwar Europe even in countries that weren't involved in the war? Sweden? Switzerland?
19: Well, the linked article (LA?) isn't being inconsistent about this, because its definition of "mass warfare" is 'basically two world wars in 30 years'. I mean, they describe the US Civil War as more or less of a wash, inequalitywise. I mean, I don't know if that part of the claim holds up, but the claim that we in the West not going to face a total mobilization war in the foreseeable future seems reasonable (seemed almost unassailable before about 11 months ago).
24. The factual answer is that the Liberal governments between 1906 and the outbreak of war were surprisingly radical in all sorts of ways. Why this was the case, however, is something I'm not going to offer an opinion on.
Coyness is unbecoming in a gentleman of your renown.
Ah I see we've reached futility. Can't wait for perversity "trying to reduce inequality will only increase it", and jeapordy "reducing inequality will" throws dart at dart board "make dealing with global warming impossible."
Part of the problem is that we are running on constitutional machinery developed to suit the needs of 18th century land owners, larded with various hacks installed by subsequent generations.
We have technology now that could potentially support something resembling direct democracy - or at least a system where people feel like their voice is empowered rather than insignificant. But getting out from under the obsolescence of the legacy system is a rather heavy lift.
the US Civil War as more or less of a wash, inequalitywise.
One would think that ending slavery would cause a significant reduction in inequalty, at least for the slaves.
33: I was going to note that, but in terms of actual income/wealth inequality, I'm not sure the change was all that stark. Among other things, sharecropping involved so much debt that I wouldn't be surprised if the bottom, say, 90% of Southern blacks had, collectively, a net income of $0.
I'd imagine Foner or someone knows.
34: Also, the planters had been heavily indebted themselves. Prewar, planters borrowed against their slaves' labor; postwar, freed slaves borrowed against their own.
On reflection, that's probably wrong; both planters and sharecroppers borrowed against their anticipated crops year to year, while prewar slaves were a separate category of assets and debts which evaporated postwar. Anyway I don't remember enough of this stuff to argue.
7: my takeaway from the post is that I welcome the imminent climate-change cataclysm as a force for social justice and equality. It's going to be epic.
I assume you mean that the author of the linked article means that, not that you do.
It's impossible to avoid noting that the Trump presidency is an exercise in heightening the contradictions, such that the sort of thing some (e.g. Jill Stein voters) hoped for -- that defeating Hillary would somehow promote the general welfare -- is, even as we speak, inspiring ... oh, whatever.
We should have a separate shorthands for "original post" and "the article linked in the original post"
post: Kal-El
linked article: Superboy Prime
Ideally we could use the tools of democracy but we need to be realistic and use the threat of violent uprising
Among other things, sharecropping involved so much debt that I wouldn't be surprised if the bottom, say, 90% of Southern blacks had, collectively, a net income of $0.
Sure, but $0 and not being whipped is closer to equality than $0 and being subject to the whip.
37: It is inevitable that, absent a global calamity, things will eventually turn around and the contradiction heighteners will declare themselves prophets.
If we do have a global calamity, I will take some consolation from the fact that it will silence those smug fuckheads.
41: Won't the smug fuckheads just take the increase in equality that follows the calamity as evidence of the success of contradiction-heightening?
That is, assuming any of them survive the calamity, I suppose.
I think it all boils down to the tax code. Perhaps the great levelings were the result of tax code changes needed to pay off war debts or rebuild infrastructure after war. Only the rich have the money so tax them and their estates. Then a miracle happens - a more equal society!
|| Grounds for a Sessions recusal, no? |>
27: I don't know about Switzerland, but Sweden until at least about 1960 took very seriously the prospect of European war. Leaving aside the Norwegian perspective, I think that the patriotism/nationalism of the Social Democrats, and their appeal to the kind of social solidarity which is backed up by the threat of war, is greatly underestimated. I think it's reasonable to say that Sweden took part in both big European wars by every means short of fighting. And, obviously, fighting makes a big difference But so does taking seriously the existential threat to your country of which fighting is merely the physical expression. You can still have rationing, conscription, governments of genuine national unity, and so on, without the guns being actually fired.
There are other contributing causes to the Swedish egalitarianism, partly in peasant culture, partly in reaction to the almost equally strong tradition, now largely forgotten, of Swedish inegalitarianism. You have to have a very authoritarian state to dismantle privilege, and you don't get that without a general acceptance of authority.
Switzerland took the idea of a European war relatively seriously. They still have mandatory military service. The bridges over the Rhine were lined with explosives. Apartment buildings have bomb shelters in their basements, complete with air filters. (The military sends somebody to check the filters every five years.)
the almost equally strong tradition, now largely forgotten, of Swedish inegalitarianism.
This was really striking when I was in Gothenburg; it was the major emigration port for Swedes heading to the US in the 19th century, and a huge number went, in large part because of inequality at home.
You can still have rationing, conscription, governments of genuine national unity, and so on, without the guns being actually fired.
But it doesn't always lead to greater equality. Look at the USSR - it was extremely unequal by European standards right up to the end of the 70s (and again now, of course). And it was at its most unequal during and immediately after the war.
And how come, if major wars reduce inequality, that you see reductions in inequality in postwar Europe even in countries that weren't involved in the war? Sweden? Switzerland?
I think it's important to consider the way that a major social upheaval in one country can have ripple effects -- might it not be the case that seeing the postwar changes going on around them, reformers/progressives/whatevs were emboldened to keep up with the zeitgeist in their own country? That is, if you're a Swiss social democrat in 1945-1960, you'd have a wealth of data and examples on how to reform society flowing to you from other countries nearby. Much easier to make the case then that you're just instituting reforms that would "naturally" come about anyway.
48: that makes sense, but I think every time you add one of those you weaken the argument. We're now at "reductions in inequality can only occur when your country, or a country next door or nearby, has gone through some sort of major war, state failure, epidemic or violent revolution recently, or at least within the last 40 years".
And, as I say, " your country, or a country next door or nearby, has gone through some sort of major war, state failure, epidemic or violent revolution recently, or at least within the last 40 years" covers most of history for most countries, including lots of periods when society got markedly more unequal, not less.
48 is a good point. Welfare state was an easier sell after WW2 because it had the air of inevitability. Globalization had the same air in the later point of the century. It's depressing to think that ethnonationalism will have the same air in a couple of years.
Welfare state was an easier sell after WW2 because it had the air of inevitability.
But, wait, most of the basic welfare state was in place before WW2. US Social Security came in in 1935. The UK old age pension, unemployment benefit and national insurance all came in before WW1 - and the UK had never been richer and more peaceful in its history. There hadn't been a major war in Europe for forty years (1871) and the UK hadn't fought a major war in almost a century. Far less had there been a failed state or a revolution or an epidemic.
I'm only endorsing the herding behavior point, not the point about war. I have no opinion on that part.
Depends what you mean by welfare state, obviously. Nye Bevan might have some thoughts about most of it being in place before WWI.
In the paper today, Sweden is reintroducing the draft because of the situation in the Baltic. Which underlines NW's point just a little.
54 In the paper today, Sweden is reintroducing the draft because of the situation in the Baltic Trump.
Would there be this kind of tension in the Baltics or any doubt that the US would honor it's NATO commitment to the defense of the Baltic states as they fucking honored their NATO commitment to the defense of the US when the US called upon them if it weren't for Trump?
50, 51: more fear of anarchist, communist, and populist rebellion than we popularly remember, for the stick. Backed up by most people knowing the establishment was pretty corrupt by its own lights.
For the carrot, wealth unprecedented and maybe irreproducible, from fossil fuel.
55: not only terrifying but goddamn embarrassing. How does this strategy sell itself as strong?
I'm feeling pretty good about my call in 44.